

ANNEX I - NIS COORDINATION

1. The main efforts of the NIS Coordinator during the year were directed towards the development of capabilities within the Intelligence Agencies for a balanced production of NIS in accordance with scheduled commitments. The difficulties which resulted from the Korean war not only reduced production severely but also greatly unbalanced the whole NIS Program. Moreover, the new staffs were incapable of satisfactory work without considerable indoctrination and training. Experience in this respect indicates that it takes six months to a year to develop competent analysts for NIS work. This fact accounts in large measure for the slow resurgence of production even with a fairly large increase in staffs, and for the continued qualitative deficiencies in contributions.

2. Another important aspect of the NIS Program which was accorded considerable emphasis was the Improvement of NIS procedures and requirements. During the year, the NIS Standard Instructions, including the editorial instructions, were completely revised. An entirely new organization was set up under the Scientific Intelligence Committee to produce Chapter VII, with coordination accomplished by the Chairman of the SIC (Assistant Director, Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA). While the reorganizational problems were considerable and delayed production, a major revision of Chapter VII on the USSR had substantially been completed by the end of the year.

3. A third important concern of the NIS Coordinator throughout the year has been the development of adequate measures for the collection of basic intelligence necessary for NIS requirements under the maintenance program. It is apparent that much of the information in published NIS is incomplete and inaccurate. This was to be expected since time did not permit of comprehensive collection effort during the initial phase of NIS production. It is gratifying to note, however, that all contributing agencies have made substantial provisions for basic intelligence collection. In general terms, field activities are required to review all published NIS contributions on areas and categories for which they are responsible, and to make summary reports of errors to their departments. In addition, there are adequate provisions for the initiation of collection to fill "gap" information indicated in subsections "Comments on Principal Sources". While collection capabilities of the Armed Forces have been substantially increased, they are still incapable in many areas of meeting the comprehensive NIS requirements.

4. Considerable improvement was made in strengthening the coordinating and reviewing components in the Intelligence Agencies. These have been noticeably weak from the very beginning of the NIS Program with the result that the qualitative adequacy of contributions has been seriously deficient. All agencies have now made provisions for better qualified

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coordinating and reviewing staffs and for a more careful examination of NIS contributions before transmittal to CIA. While this will eventually result in a much needed qualitative improvement in NIS contributions, it has temporarily reduced production flow from the contributing agencies, since a large percentage of inadequate contributions are being turned back at the contributing agencies' level.

5. Improved inter-agency working level coordination has resulted from more frequent conferences and consultations. Increased emphasis has been given to improving the correlation of related intelligence appearing in the various sections of each NIS, which is increasingly more difficult as more sections are published. To assist contributors in this respect, there has been developed during the year the "NIS Correlation Guide" which sets forth the inter-relationships of subject categories covered by NIS requirements, in terms of fundamental and secondary treatment, so that proper cross-checking of data can be undertaken by contributors during the early stages of production.

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7. On 16 January 1951, the NIS Committee issued a Special Report to the Director of Central Intelligence for consideration by the Intelligence Advisory Committee. The Committee recommended a substantial increase in NIS production in view of the critical world situation and the urgency of completing NIS on strategically important areas at an early date. The IAC considered these proposals on 16 March 1951, and decided the best that could be done for the remainder of Fiscal Year 1951 was to build up capabilities within the Intelligence Agencies to at least an 8 NIS-a-year level, and to reconsider this matter when the required level of production had been attained, with the view to possible further augmentation. The JCS High Priority List was amended on 21 February 1951 by the addition of a new "Highest Priority" Group of 24 NIS Areas selected from the JCS list of high priority countries and subdivided into 3 priority groupings. The main effect of this amendment was increased emphasis on Far Eastern and Satellite countries.

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